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Abstract 
 
 
In distributive negotiations, people often feel that they have to choose between maximizing 
their economic outcomes (claiming more value) or improving their relational outcomes 
(having a satisfied opponent). The present research proposes a conversational strategy that can 
help negotiators achieve both. Specifically, we show that using an offer framing strategy that 
shifts offer recipients’ attention to their reservation price (e.g., “How does my offer compare 
to your minimum price?”) leads to both (a) an assimilation effect whereby recipients make 
more favorable counteroffers (economic benefit) as well as (b) a contrast effect whereby 
recipients feel more satisfied with the negotiation (relational benefit). We find evidence for 
the effectiveness of this conversational strategy across four experiments (N=1,522) involving 
different negotiation contexts (real estate, restaurant sale) and participant samples (MBAs, 
sales agents, online participants), and also document negotiator power as an important 
boundary condition. Overall, our research suggests that economic and relational benefits do 
not have to be mutually exclusive in distributive negotiations, that the perceived extremity of 
an offer is subjective and can be strategically influenced, and that assimilation and contrast 
effects can operate simultaneously when they relate to separate outcomes.   
 
 
Keywords: negotiation, first offer, framing, satisfaction, power, reservation price
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 Negotiation is an inherently economic activity involving the exchange of scarce 
resources between parties with different interests (Pruitt, 1981). For example, in many buyer-
seller transactions, sellers want to sell at the highest possible price whereas buyers prefer to 
pay the lowest possible price. Yet, negotiation is also an inherently relational activity. 
Negotiators want to feel good about themselves, the negotiation process, and their counterpart 
(Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). A seller may not just care about the final price but also 
about how the buyer treated them during the negotiation.  
 Negotiators often assume that maximizing economic gains will hurt their relationships 
in “distributive” negotiations, which involve competitive issues where parties’ preferences are 
diametrically opposed. Indeed, when we asked 136 individuals to imagine a buyer-seller 
transaction and indicate their agreement with the statement “the less money the buyer offers 
the seller, the less happy the seller will be,” an overwhelming majority (86%) agreed and the 
overall level of agreement (M=5.63; SD=1.31) was well above the midpoint of the 7-point 
scale, t(135)=14.52, p<0.001 (see Supplemental Online Materials).   
 Consistent with the findings from our survey, past research on distributive negotiations 
shows that strategies which maximize economic gains such as expressing dominant emotions 
and making ambitious first offers increase negotiators’ economic gains but hurt the 
relationship between negotiators (Hart & Schweitzer, 2019; Hüffmeier, Freund, Zerres, 
Backhaus, & Hertel, 2014; Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 
2010). Moreover, recent research found that negotiators who pushed for more favorable 
agreements not only risked greater relational costs during the negotiation, but also 
undermined their counterpart’s motivation and productivity afterwards (Hart & Schweitzer, 
2019). This research also noted that “softer, more concessionary strategies […] often lead to 
better affective and relational outcomes” but they “may not lead to high economic outcomes” 
(p.3). Thus, our survey and past research jointly suggest that negotiators assume that 
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economic gains and relational outcomes are in conflict and that negotiators should sacrifice 
their own economic gains to maintain the relationship.  
 Based on earlier work showing that economic outcomes and subjective evaluations 
can be disconnected (e.g., Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002; Schaerer, Swaab, & 
Galinsky, 2015), we propose that negotiators may be able to win both economically and 
relationally by framing their offers strategically. Specifically, we posit that negotiators who 
make a first offer and shift their counterpart’s attention to their reservation price (e.g., “How 
does my offer compare to the minimum price you would be willing to accept?”) can receive 
more favorable counteroffers but also increase their counterpart’s satisfaction by shifting their 
attention to a lower reference point. We test this idea in four experiments using different 
recipient-focus manipulations (exogenously and opponent induced), different negotiation 
scenarios (real estate, restaurant sale), and different samples with varying levels of experience 
(MBAs, sales agents, online participants). 
 Our research makes important theoretical contributions. First, we show that economic 
and relational benefits are not mutually exclusive in the context of distributive negotiations 
and that strategic offer framing can help negotiators achieve both. This finding extends earlier 
research showing that changes in negotiator focus can differentially affect negotiators’ deals 
and evaluations (Galinksy et al., 2002) by demonstrating that these insights can also be used 
as an interpersonal negotiation strategy. Moreover, we extend this research by showing that 
negotiators are not naturally inclined to use this strategy and by documenting negotiator 
power as an important boundary condition that attenuates (and even reverses) these effects. 
Second, this research contributes to the growing stream of research on offer framing in 
negotiations (Majer, Troetschel, Galinsky, & Loschelder, 2019) which examines how 
different offer frames can elicit greater cooperation. Third, we extend research on judgment 
and decision making, which typically assumes that assimilation and contrast effects tend to be 
mutually exclusive (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Förster, Liberman, & Kuschel, 2008) by 
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demonstrating that both processes can operate simultaneously when they pertain to different 
outcomes. Finally, this research has practical value because negotiators know few distributive 
strategies that do not come at either an economic or relational cost. 
Outcomes and Evaluations in Distributive Negotiations 
 A central assumption of negotiation research and practice is that economic outcomes 
and negotiators’ satisfaction are deeply intertwined and mutually exclusive in distributive 
negotiations (Brett & Thompson, 2016; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010), such that 
strategies that improve economic gains hurt relationships, and strategies improving 
relationships hurt economic gains. Negotiators are therefore often advised to either claim 
value or to build relationships (e.g., Keiser, 1988; Thompson, 2011) 
 In contrast to this advice, we propose that claiming more value and having a more 
satisfied opponent do not need to be mutually exclusive. We base this argument on research 
suggesting that economic outcomes and subjective evaluations are sometimes disconnected, 
implying that it is possible to improve both economic gains and relationships (Ames & 
Mason, 2015; Galinsky et al., 2002; Lee & Ames, 2017; Neale & Bazerman, 1983; Shirako, 
Kilduff, & Kray, 2015). For example, Lee and Ames (2017) found that using constraint-
related rationales (“I can’t pay more”), compared to disparagement rationales (“It’s not worth 
more”), increased both accommodating negotiation behavior and trust by the counterpart. 
Furthermore, Galinsky et al. (2002) showed that negotiators’ outcomes and evaluations are 
disconnected, such that negotiators who focused on a high anchor reached better deals but 
were less satisfied compared to negotiators who focused on a low anchor.  
 Building on the idea that outcomes and evaluations may are not always be opposing 
forces in distributive negotiations, we propose an interpersonal offer framing strategy that 
shifts negotiators’ attention to their bottom line (i.e., “How does my offer compare to the 
highest possible price you can afford / lowest possible price you’re willing to accept?”), 
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which should cause the offer recipient to both make less ambitious counteroffers and leave 
them more satisfied with the negotiation.  
Win-Win through Strategic Offer Framing 
 Negotiation outcomes are typically compared, coded, and evaluated relative to 
reference points (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). A critical reference point in negotiations is the 
reservation price (White, Valley, Bazerman, Neale, & Peck, 1994), which refers to a 
negotiator’s bottom line and helps them determine when to walk away from a negotiation. 
Negotiators are advised to secure outcomes closer to advantageous reference points such as 
their target price (e.g., their ideal outcome) and farther from disadvantageous reference points 
such as their reservation price (Thompson, 2011). We propose that the effectiveness of 
shifting others’ attention to their bottom line relies on two distinct psychological processes–
assimilation bias and contrastive evaluation–which in turn affect the offer recipient’s 
economic decisions and subjective evaluations.  
Offer Framing and Assimilation Bias 
First, we propose that senders who make an offer and shift the recipient’s focus to 
their reservation price create an assimilation bias in the recipient’s counteroffer. For example, 
when a sender makes the recipient’s reservation price more salient by asking the recipient to 
explicitly think about it, recipients anchor on this disadvantageous reference point, 
insufficiently adjust away from this low anchor, and make less ambitious counteroffers.  
 Research has repeatedly shown that salient reference points have pervasive effects on 
economic decisions by acting as anchors that influence subsequent judgments through a 
process called assimilation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Assimilation occurs because 
people insufficiently adjust away from a salient anchor (Epley & Gilovich, 2006) by making 
anchor-consistent information more accessible (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000) and because 
anchors can alter people’s “mental rulers” on which they make judgments (Frederick & 
Mochon, 2012).  
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 Evidence of assimilation has also been documented in negotiations. Indeed, reference 
points such as alternatives and market information can be dominant cues that affect decisions 
in negotiations (Blount, Thomas-Hunt, & Neale, 1996). For example, in distributive 
negotiations, the value of the first offer is strongly correlated with negotiation outcomes 
(Gunia, Swaab, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2013; Schaerer, Loschelder, & Swaab, 2016) 
because negotiators anchor on the value of the first offer and insufficiently adjust away from 
it. Thus, an offer framing strategy whereby the offer sender shifts the recipient’s focus on 
their reservation price should bias the recipient towards this reference point, cause less 
ambitious counteroffers and result in worse negotiation outcomes. 
Offer Framing and Contrast Effects  
Second, we propose that the same strategy that causes assimilation in counteroffers 
can simultaneously lead to contrast effects in subjective evaluations. Contrast effects suggest 
that “presenting a context stimulus changes the adaptation level of the judge so that the 
perception of the target stimulus is altered” (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999, p. 137). The 
philosopher John Locke (1690) was one of the first to document the basic logic of the contrast 
effect; he noted that lukewarm water can feel cold or hot, depending on whether one’s hand 
has previously touched hot or cold water. More recently, Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich 
(1995) showed that Olympic medalists winning bronze medals were more satisfied (because 
they just made the top 3) than those winning silver medals (because they missed gold). 
 The logic of contrastive judgment demonstrates that most evaluations are relative and 
that people compare their outcomes with available and salient evaluation standards because 
objective outcomes are difficult to judge without context (Loewenstein, Thompson, & 
Bazerman, 1989). Similarly, in negotiations people often evaluate their outcomes using 
contextual cues to determine how well they did. For instance, negotiators with low 
performance expectations were more satisfied with their agreements than those with high 
expectations (Oliver, Balakrishnan, & Barry, 1994), and negotiators who compared their 
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outcome to a high value were less satisfied than those who compared it to a low value 
(Galinsky et al., 2002). Thus, contrastive comparisons can make people subjectively happier 
about economically worse outcomes.  
 We predict therefore that when senders make an offer and ask the recipient to compare 
the offer to their reservation price, recipients evaluate the sender’s offer more positively 
because the relatively disadvantageous reference point of the reservation price serves as a low 
comparison standard. Conversely, when senders make an offer and ask recipients to compare 
the offer to their target price, a relatively advantageous reference point that serves as a high 
comparison standard, recipients will evaluate the offer as a loss, resulting in less positive 
evaluations. Senders are therefore more likely to reap both economic benefits (more attractive 
counteroffers) and relational benefits (more satisfied recipients) when asking recipients how 
their offer compares to their reservation price rather than their target price or using no framing 
strategy.  
 To demonstrate the counterintuitive nature of the proposed strategy, we coded a 
sample of 152 interactive negotiations amongst 304 MBA students and found that only very 
few used a reservation price framing (N=4, 1.32% of all negotiators) or a target framing (N=6, 
1.97% of all negotiators) when making their offers (see Supplemental Online Materials). To 
examine what negotiators would do when they need to choose between these two frames, we 
presented three different samples of MBA students (N=234), undergraduates (N=136), and 
MTurk participants (N=107) with a recruiting negotiation scenario and asked them whether 
they preferred to use a target price or reservation price framing. The overwhelming majority 
preferred the target price framing (MBAs: 68.8%; Undergraduates: 84.6%; MTurk: 88.8%). 
When we asked the undergraduate sample why they preferred the target frame over the 
reservation price frame, two-thirds (60.1%) mentioned that they did so due to relational 
concerns (e.g., not offending their counterpart, being polite). Together, these findings show 
that negotiators are not naturally inclined to use a reservation price framing, even when it is 
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an explicit option. Despite the fact that most people were worried about offending the other 
party with a reservation price frame, our studies ironically show that it is exactly this frame 
(and not their preferred target frame) that increases their opponent’s satisfaction.  
Overview of the Present Research 
 We tested our predictions across four experiments. In Study 1, MBA students 
participated in a real estate negotiation and tested the prediction that shifting offer recipients’ 
focus on their reservation price would cause both less ambitious counteroffers and more 
positive evaluations of the offer they received. Study 2 sought to replicate this effect with 
both online participants (Study 2a) and experienced negotiators (Study 2b) when the 
reservation price focus was induced by the counterpart. Finally, Study 3 aimed to replicate the 
effect in a different context and established recipient power as a boundary condition.  
 We calculated required cell size based on the conservative assumptions of a small 
effect size (f = .10) and a required power of .90, resulting in approximately 84 
observations/cell. Across studies we therefore aimed to recruit 100 participants per 
experimental condition, with the exception of Study 1 in which the sample size was even 
larger due to the fixed MBA cohort size. We report all measures, manipulations, and 
exclusions. Sensitivity power analyses and manipulation checks are reported in the 
Supplemental Online Materials. Data, syntax, and materials can be accessed at: 
https://osf.io/cm48t/?view_only=bb1f1f3fb398411ca5e8ff12a7105082. 
Study 1 
 Study 1 tested the hypothesis that offer recipients make less ambitious counteroffers 
but will be more satisfied when they are asked to focus on their reservation price.  
Participants and design 
 Participants were 444 professionals (mean age=28.81; SD=2.33; 34.9% female) 
enrolled in an MBA program. Participants were randomly assigned to either a target-focus, 
reservation price-focus, or control condition.  
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Procedure and experimental manipulations 
Participants received the study invitation via email and completed it online, outside of 
class. The negotiation was a single-issue distributive negotiation involving the price of a 
condominium. Participants were sellers (offer recipients) who had to sell a 3-bedroom condo 
by negotiating with a potential buyer (offer sender). The target price at which the condo could 
sell was $520,000 and their reservation price was $380,000 because this was the best offer 
from another buyer.  
We adopted a negotiator focus manipulation from past research (Galinsky et al., 2002). 
Participants in the target-focus condition were told “successful negotiators recommend that 
you should focus on your target price during the negotiation” and briefly described their target 
price and what it meant for their upcoming negotiation. In the reservation price-focus 
condition, participants read that “successful negotiators recommend that you should focus on 
your walk-away price during the negotiation” and briefly described their reservation price and 
what it meant for the upcoming negotiation. To test whether a reservation price frame would 
improve outcomes above and beyond using no strategy, we also added a control condition in 
which participants did not receive any additional information or prompts.  
Next, all participants were informed that the potential buyer offered $450,000 and then 
completed our dependent measures.  
Measures 
Counteroffer. Participants were asked “What is your counteroffer to the buyer?” and 
entered their offer in a textbox. Lower counteroffers are more favorable for the buyer.  
Satisfaction. Our second dependent measure was participants’ satisfaction with the 
offer they received. Participants indicated how happy, satisfied, and pleased they were with 
the offer (1=not at all; 7=very much). The three items were combined (α=.90).  
Results  
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Because one of the dependent measures was numeric, we used a two-step data 
cleaning approach to reduce the influence of extreme values for counteroffers. First, a 
research assistant unfamiliar with the research corrected decimal errors. Because we did not 
restrict participants’ counteroffers to a specific range to better capture their intuitive behavior, 
some participants used different units (e.g., entered $480 instead of $480,000). Second, we 
followed past negotiation research to exclude values that deviated more than 3SDs from the 
condition mean (Schaerer, Schweinsberg, & Swaab, 2018; Schaerer et al., 2015). We applied 
this procedure across all studies. In Study 1, four outliers were dropped and we analyzed the 
remaining 440 observations.  
We predicted that negotiators who focused on their reservation price would lower their 
counteroffers but be more satisfied relative to the other two conditions. This is what we found 
(Figure 1). A 3(focus: reservation price vs. control vs. target) × 2(outcome: counteroffer vs. 
satisfaction) mixed-design ANOVA produced a significant interaction effect, F(2, 
437)=18.69, p<.001, ηp2=.08.  
Negotiators who focused on their reservation price made less ambitious counteroffers 
(M=510,092, SD=36,206) than those in the target-focus condition (M=534,880, SD=31,608), 
t(437)=6.11, p<.001, d=.73, and those in the control condition (M=521,283, SD=35,019), 
t(437)=2.81, p=.005, d=.31. Negotiators in the target-focus condition made more ambitious 
offers than those in the control condition, t(437)=3.39, p=.001, d=.41. 
However, we found opposite patterns for satisfaction. Negotiators who were asked to 
focus on their reservation price were more satisfied with the offer they received (M=4.74, 
SD=1.28) than those who focused on their target (M=3.30, SD=1.30), t(437)=10.02, p<.001, 
d=1.12, and those in the control condition (M=4.05, SD=1.07), t(437)=4.84, p<.001, d=.58. 
Those in the target-focus condition were less satisfied than those in the control condition, 
t(437)=5.34, p<.001, d=.64. 
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Figure 1. Counteroffers and satisfaction by condition (Study 1). Lower counteroffers and 
higher satisfaction reflect a more favorable outcome for the buyer.   
 
Discussion 
 Study 1 suggests that offer recipients who are asked to focus on their reservation price 
will both make counteroffers that are more favorable to the sender and will be more satisfied.  
Studies 2a-b 
 Studies 2a-2b improved Study 1 in four ways. First, we embedded the reservation 
price-focus manipulation directly in a message coming from the offer sender to test whether 
the observed effect would replicate in the context of strategic offer framing. Second, to 
establish generalizability, Study 2 used different participant samples including MTurk 
workers (Study 2a) and professional sales people with extensive negotiation experience 
(Study 2b) as past research suggests that experts react differently to negotiation strategies than 
amateurs (Loschelder, Friese, Schaerer, & Galinsky, 2016). Third, in addition to measuring 
offer recipients’ counteroffers, Study 2 also measured negotiators’ lowest price they are 
willing to accept (WTA) as an additional proxy of the negotiation outcome and to test whether 
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Loschelder et al., 2016; Thomas, Simon, & Kadiyali, 2010). Finally, Study 2a tested the 
alternative explanation that the effects of our offer framing strategy are caused by changes in 
offer recipients’ regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998; Trötschel, Bündgens, Hüffmeier, & 
Loschelder, 2013), such that focusing on one’s reservation price (vs. not) would cause offer 
recipients to focus more on avoiding negative outcomes rather than approaching positive 
outcomes.   
Study 2a 
Participants and design 
 We recruited 306 individuals (mean age=36.69; SD=10.12; 48.3% female) from the 
U.S. via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants received $1.00 for their participation. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a target-frame, reservation price-frame, or a 
control condition. 
Procedure and experimental manipulations 
 The task was similar to Study 1, except that participants received a different 
reservation price ($320,000) and target price ($580,000), and the offer frame was directly 
embedded in a message coming from the offer sender. Specifically, in the reservation price-
frame condition, the message said “My offer is $450,000. How does this offer compare to the 
minimum price you are willing to accept?” In the target-frame condition the message read 
“My offer is $450,000. How does this offer compare to your target price?” In the control 
condition, the message simply said: “My offer is $450,000.” Participants then completed our 
dependent measures and a demographic questionnaire. 
Measures 
Counteroffer. Participants responded to the prompt, “What is your counteroffer to the 
buyer?” and entered their offer in a textbox. A lower counteroffer again represents a more 
favorable outcome for the buyer. 
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Willingness-to-accept (WTA). Extending Study 1, participants also indicated the 
lowest price they would be willing to accept. A lower WTA represents a more favorable 
outcome for the buyer. 
Satisfaction. Participants indicated how happy, satisfied, and pleased they were with 
the offer (1=not at all; 7=very much; α=.97). 
Regulatory focus. We adopted a 1-item regulatory focus measure developed by 
Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, and Mussweiler (2005). Participants indicated whether they 
focused on avoiding negative outcomes or approaching positive outcomes on a bi-polar 7-
point scale. Higher scores indicate more focus on approaching positive outcomes. 
Results  
We used the same data cleaning approach as in Study 1 and dropped 8 observations as 
a result, leaving 298 observations.  
We predicted that recipients would make less ambitious counteroffers, have a lower 
WTA, and would be more satisfied with the offer when senders ask them to focus on their 
reservation price. A 3(offer frame: reservation price vs. control vs. target) × 3(outcome: 
counteroffer vs. WTA vs. satisfaction) mixed-design ANOVA produced a significant 
interaction effect, F(2, 295)=31.45, p<.001, ηp2=.18.  
Negotiators who received the reservation price-frame made less ambitious 
counteroffers (M=470,200, SD=54,696) than those in the control condition (M=506,778, 
SD=35,016), t(295)=5.76, p<.001, d=.82, and those in the target-frame condition, 
(M=522,717, SD=42,361), t(295)=8.27, p<.001, d=1.17. Negotiators in the target-frame 
condition made higher offers than control participants, t(295)=2.50, p=.013, d=.36 (Figure 2). 
Similarly, negotiators in the reservation price-frame condition reported lower WTAs 
(M=433,900, SD=59,223) than those in the control condition (M=466,515, SD=35,519), 
t(295)=5.00, p<.001, d=.71, and those in the target-frame condition, (M=484,899, 
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SD=39,416), t(295)=7.83, p<.001, d=1.11. Negotiators in the target-frame condition reported 
higher WTAs than those in the control condition, t(295)=2.81, p=.005, d=.40. 
We again found the opposite patterns for negotiator satisfaction. Although they made 
lower counteroffers, negotiators who focused on their reservation price were also more 
satisfied (M=5.37, SD=1.28) than those in the control condition (M=4.91, SD=1.29), 
t(295)=2.39, p=.018, d=.34, and those in the target-frame condition, (M=4.16, SD=1.51), 
t(295)=6.26, p<.001, d=.89. Negotiators in the target-frame condition were less satisfied than 
control participants, t(295)=3.86, p<.001, d=.55 (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Counteroffers and satisfaction by condition (Study 2a). Lower counteroffers and 
higher satisfaction reflect more favorable outcomes for the buyer. 
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t(295)=.92, p=.36, d=.13. Negotiators in the target-frame condition were marginally more 
promotion-focused than those in the control condition, t(295)=1.75, p=.082, d=.25. Thus, 
regulatory focus is unlikely to explain why those in the reservation price-focus condition were 
less ambitious and more satisfied. 
Study 2b 
Participants and design 
 We recruited 201 professional salespeople (mean age=32.10; SD=10.07; 55.5% 
female, 42.5% male, 3.5% not indicated) from Prolific Academic in exchange for £1.50 and a 
chance to win one of three £100 Amazon vouchers. Participants had to be full-time employees 
and their job had to involve both direct customer sales and negotiating. Participants were 
predominantly from English-speaking countries (U.K.=71.1%, U.S.=23.7%, other=5.2%). Job 
descriptions of participants included real estate agents, car sales, insurance sales, medical 
device sales, antique dealers, etc. Participants were randomly assigned to a target-frame or 
reservation price-frame condition.  
Procedure, experimental manipulations, and measures 
The scenario was identical to Study 1, with two exceptions. First, and similar to Study 
2a, the offer frame manipulation was embedded in a message from the offer sender. 
Specifically, in the reservation price-frame condition, the message said “My offer is 
£450,000. How does that compare to your fallback offer?” In the target-frame condition the 
message read “My offer is £450,000. How does that compare to your target?” Second, we 
changed the currency to British Pounds. After exposure to the offer frame manipulation, 
participants reported their counteroffers, WTA, and satisfaction (α=.93).   
Results  
 We used the same data cleaning rule as in the previous studies, leading to the removal 
of 11 outliers (final N=190). 
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We predicted that recipients would make less ambitious counteroffers, have a lower 
WTA, and be more satisfied when senders ask them to focus on their reservation price. A 
2(offer frame: reservation price vs. target) × 3(outcome: counteroffer vs. WTA vs. 
satisfaction) mixed-design ANOVA produced a significant interaction, F(2, 187)=19.37, 
p<.001, ηp2=.17.  
Follow-up contrast analyses showed that negotiators who were asked to focus on their 
reservation price made less ambitious counteroffers (M=483,155, SD=30,151) than those who 
focused on their target (M=497,914, SD=19,265), t(188)=4.01, p<.001, d=.58.  
Similarly, negotiators who were asked to focus on their reservation price reported a 
lower WTA (M=448,026, SD=34,096) than those who focused on their target (M=472,713, 
SD=19,378), t(188)=6.12, p<.001, d=.89 (see Figure 3).  
Also, as predicted, negotiators asked to focus on their reservation price were more 
satisfied (M=5.02, SD=1.07) than those who focused on their target (M=4.31, SD=1.11), 
t(188)=4.50, p<.001, d=.65 (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3. Willingness-to-accept and satisfaction by condition (Study 2b).  
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 Study 2 demonstrated that directing offer recipients’ focus on their reservation price 
through strategic offer framing causes them to make less ambitious counteroffers and set 
lower bottom lines while exhibiting increased satisfaction. Study 2a suggests regulatory focus 
is unlikely to explain these effects. Finally, Study 2b demonstrated that this strategy was also 
effective with experienced negotiators.  
Study 3 
 The purpose of Study 3 was twofold. First, we wanted to test our theoretical 
assumptions using a moderation-by-process approach (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005), while 
simultaneously identifying a practically-relevant boundary condition. Our theorizing suggests 
that for the reservation price frame to cause assimilation and contrast effects, offer recipients’ 
reservation price should be relatively less attractive than their target price (see also Galinsky 
et al., 2002). An important factor that impacts the relative attractiveness and the willingness to 
comply with a request is a negotiator’s power. Indeed, negotiators who have a lot of power 
(i.e., have an attractive outside offer) tend to have higher reservation prices than negotiators 
who have less power (Galinsky, Schaerer, & Magee, 2017; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994; 
Schaerer, Teo, Madan, & Swaab, 2020) and tend to be less affected by the opponent’s 
influence tactics (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). Thus, in Study 3 we 
manipulated whether offer recipients had a very weak or very strong reservation price and 
predicted that strategic offer framing would be less effective when offer recipients have a lot 
of power because this would direct their focus on a relatively strong reservation price. A 
second goal of Study 3 was to replicate the effect using a different negotiation context.   
Participants and design 
 We recruited 603 MTurkers (mean age=36.69; SD=10.12; 48.3% female) in exchange 
for $1.00. Participants were randomly assigned to a 3(offer frame: reservation price vs. 
control vs. target) × 2(recipient power: low vs. high) between-subjects design. 
Procedure, experimental manipulations, and measures 
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 Participants assumed the role of the retiring owner of a restaurant chain called 
“Vindaloo’s”, trying to sell their business. An independent accountant had estimated its value 
at $10.5 million (their target price) and that a venture capital firm had already offered $4.5 
million (low power condition) or $9.5 million (high power condition), which was the lowest 
price they would be willing to accept (their reservation price). Participants then read a 
message from a buyer who offered $7.5 million.  
 In the reservation price-frame condition the message said “My offer for Vindaloo's is 
$7.5 million. How does this offer compare to the minimum price you would be willing to 
accept?” In the target-frame condition, the message said “My offer for Vindaloo's is $7.5 
million. How does this offer compare to the ideal price you would like to achieve?” In the 
control condition, the message simply said: “My offer for Vindaloo's is $7.5 million.” 
Participants then reported their counteroffers and satisfaction (α=.99) and completed a 
demographic questionnaire. 
Results  
We used the same data cleaning approach as before. Nine observations were dropped 
(final N=594).  
We predicted that recipients would make less ambitious counteroffers and be more 
satisfied when senders ask them to focus on their reservation price, but not when the offer 
recipient is high in power. A 3(offer frame) × 3(recipient power) × 2(outcome) mixed 
ANOVA produced a significant three-way interaction, F(2, 588)=11.78, p<.001, ηp2=.04.  
We first analyzed the outcomes of low-power recipients. Replicating Studies 1-2, 
negotiators who received the reservation price-frame made less ambitious counteroffers 
(M=8.58, SD=1.10) than those in the control condition (M=9.04, SD=1.11), t(294)=3.04, 
p=.003, d=.43, and those in the target-frame condition, (M=9.05, SD=.97), t(294)=3.11, 
p=.002, d=.44. There was no difference between the target-frame and control conditions, 
t(294)=.05, p=.96, d=.01. Again, we found opposite effects for satisfaction. Negotiators who 
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focused on their reservation price were more satisfied (M=5.45, SD=.99) than those in the 
control condition (M=5.05, SD=1.29), t(294)=2.29, p=.023, d=.33, and those in the target-
frame condition, (M=4.46, SD=1.34), t(294)=5.74, p<.001, d=.81. Negotiators in the target-
frame condition were less satisfied than control participants, t(294)=3.43, p=.001, d=.49 
(Figure 4, top panel).  
We next analyzed the outcomes for high-power recipients. High-power negotiators 
who received the reservation price-frame made more ambitious counteroffers (M=10.34, 
SD=1.15) than those in the control condition (M=9.82, SD=1.47), t(294)=2.73, p=.007, d=.39, 
and similarly to those in the target-frame condition, (M=10.25, SD=1.41), t(294)=.46, p=.65, 
d=.07. Counteroffers in the target-frame conditions were higher than those in the control 
condition, t(294)=2.26, p=.024, d=.32. We also found a reversal of the satisfaction effect. 
High-power negotiators who focused on their reservation price were less satisfied (M=1.54, 
SD=1.16) than those in the control condition (M=2.04, SD=1.77), t(294)=2.44, p=.015, d=.35, 
and the difference to the target-frame condition was not significant, (M=1.77, SD=1.34), 
t(294)=1.11, p=.27, d=.16. There was no difference between the target-frame and control 
conditions, t(294)=1.32, p=.19, d=.19 (Figure 4, bottom panel). 
Discussion 
 Study 3 replicated our effects in another negotiation setting, identified an important 
moderator suggesting that assimilation and contrast effects are likely responsible for the win-
win effect, and identified a practically-relevant boundary condition: negotiator power. When 
negotiators had a lot of power (i.e., a strong outside offer) and thus a very high reservation 
price, shifting their attention on their reservation price backfired.
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Figure 4. Counteroffers and satisfaction by condition (Study 3). Lower counteroffers and 
higher satisfaction reflect a more favorable outcome for the buyer. 
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exclusive and that offer framing can help negotiators achieve both. This was supported in four 
studies documenting that strategically shifting an offer recipient’s focus on their reservation 
price causes both a) an assimilation effect that reduces the size of the recipient’s counteroffer 
and b) a contrast effect that improves the recipient’s satisfaction. We also showed that the 
strategy was no longer effective (and even backfired) when recipients had a lot of power.  
 These studies make important contributions to research on negotiations and judgment 
and decision-making. First, the idea of a “win-win” outcome in which both negotiators walk 
away from the bargaining table with a mutually beneficial deal typically refers to integrative 
negotiations in which negotiators trade-off issues to create value (Brett & Thompson, 2016). 
In contrast, our research contributes to a growing stream of research (e.g., Ames & Mason, 
2015; Neale & Bazerman, 1983; Shirako et al., 2015) suggesting that even distributive 
negotiations can create better deals for oneself and more satisfied opponents. We also extend 
the findings from Galinsky et al. (2002) by showing that shifting a negotiator’s attention to 
their walkaway price a) can be used as an interpersonal strategy, b) is counterintuitive and not 
naturally used, c) improves economic and relational outcomes when compared to a baseline 
condition, and d) can backfire when recipients have a lot of power.    
 Second, recent research has suggested that negotiators react negatively to overly 
ambitious offers (Schweinsberg et al., 2012). Building on this work, we suggest that offer 
extremity may lie in the eye of the beholder, and that this is influenced by salient reference 
points which can be changed by offer-framing strategies.  
 Third, our studies contribute to research on assimilation and contrast effects (Chapman 
& Johnson, 1999; Damisch, Mussweiler, & Plessner, 2006; Förster et al., 2008; Mussweiler, 
2001b; Sherif, Taub, & Hovland, 1958), which has assumed that comparing a particular value 
either leads to assimilation or contrast. For example, Sherif et al. (1958) found that people’s 
estimates tend to converge towards the anchor (assimilation effect) if the anchor is relatively 
close to the stimuli being judged, but move away from the anchor (contrast effect) if the 
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anchor is relatively distant. Extending this work, we show that the same anchor (i.e., a 
reservation price) can simultaneously lead to assimilation and contrast effects. 
Finally, the four studies combined provide robust evidence for the effectiveness of this 
conversational strategy. This is a valuable contribution to negotiation practice because our 
studies clearly indicate that this strategy is counterintuitive and not naturally used.  
 The present work also provides exciting opportunities for future research. First, our 
studies focused on the initial stage of the negotiation (for a similar approach, see Loschelder 
et al., 2016) as past research has already established strong correlations between offers and 
negotiation outcomes (e.g., Ames & Mason, 2015; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Future 
research could test the long-term effects of offer framing as research suggests that anchoring 
effects can persist undiminished for up to a week (Mussweiler, 2001a). Second, our studies 
relied on reservation prices as “low” reference points to shift the counterpart’s focus. 
Although research suggests that reservation prices tend to be the most salient and influential 
reference points in negotiations (White et al., 1994), future research could explore whether 
other reference points (e.g., market information) could achieve the same goal. Finally, future 
research may examine whether and when negotiators misrepresent their reservation price 
when prompted to use it as a reference point and how this would affect economic and 
relational downstream consequences. 
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